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THE CONCEPT.'
BY PROF. ERNST MACH.
THE first movements of new born animals are responses to out-
ward or inward excitations, which excitations are effected
mechanically without the intervention of the intellect (the memory),
and have their foundation in the inherited organism. They are
reflex movements. Under this head belong the pecking of young
chicks, the opening of the bills of young birds on the return of their
parents with food, the swallowing of the food placed in their gul-
lets, the suckling of young mammals, etc. It may be shown that
the interference of the intellect not only does not enhance these
movements, but frequently has a tendency to disturb them even.^
It will happen that a great variety of pleasurable and unpleas-
urable sensations will be produced during this process, and these
sensations, which are peculiarly adapted to disengaging reflex
movements, will become associated with others, which in them-
selves may be indifferent, and will be ultimately stored up in the
memory, which has likewise gradually and simultaneously devel-
oped. Some small portion of the original excitation may then evoke
the memory of the entire excitation, and this memory in turn may
evoke the entire movement. The young sparrow described by me in
another place affords a good instance of this,^ and young mammals
prompted by the sight of their mother to seek nourishment, furnish
a second example. The movements which thus take place are the
final term of a series of associations; they are no longer reflex move-
1 Translated from Mach's Wdrmelehre by T. J. McCormack.
2 It is well known that after children have once been weaned they can be brought to take the
breast again only with great difficulty. But it may be necessary in cases of illness to make them
do so, and having noticed in one instance of this kind that the movements of sucking were actually
performed during sleep, I took advantage of the situation and caused the child, while asleep and
unconscious, to be laid to its mother's breast, with the result that the desired movements occurred
and the difficulty was overcome.
3 Compare my Analysis ofthe Sensations, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1897.
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ments, they are now called spontaneous movements. The question
whether the innervation as such makes its appearance in conscious-
ness not only by its results, but also immediately, we shall forego,
since it is a debated one and since the answer to it is not absolutely
necessary to our purpose.^
As soon as a movement B which has ordinarily followed as a
reflex upon an excitation R is induced spontaneously by some excita-
tion S, which is associated with R, the most varied complications
may arise, as a result of which entirely new excitational combina-
tions, and in consequence entirely new motor combinations, may
be produced. A young animal which has reached maturity is
observed to seize an object which appears fit for food, sniff at it,
nibble at it, and finally to bolt it or cast it away. Young anthro-
poid apes, so Mr. R. Franceschini informs me, are in the habit of
biting forthwith into everything offered them, whereas old apes will
toss aside objects for which they have no use after cursory inspec-
tion only. Infants too are wont to thrust into their mouths every
object they can lay hold of. A friend of mine once observed a
child grasp repeatedly at a burnt spot on a table, and immediately
convey the supposed object with comical earnestness to its mouth.
Under different circumstances having something in common,
accordingly, the same activities, the same movements, are pro-
duced, (grasping, sniffing, licking, and biting). These are produc-
tive of new sensory attributes, (odors, tastes, etc.), which become
in their turn determinative and shape the subsequent behaviour of
the animal (as swallowing, laying aside, etc.) Now it is these
accordant activities, together with the sensory attributes evoked by
them, both of which are in some manner elevated into conscious-
ness, that constitute, as I take it, \\i^ physiological foundations of the
concept. Wherever like reactions are induced, there the same con-
cept is evoked ; as many reactions as there are, so many concepts
will there be. No one will feel disposed to deny to an animal that
has acted in the manner described, the possession of something like
the germs of the concepts "food," "non-food," etc., even though
the words designating these concepts be wanting. But even des-
ignation by speech, in the form of calls and cries, may under cer-
tain circumstances accompany the acts we are considering, not-
withstanding the fact that the calls are provoked involuntarily and
never clearly appear in consciousness as deliberate signals. The
concepts which originate in this manner will be exceedingly com-
prehensive and vague in character; but they are none the less the
1 Compare W. James's Psychology, New York, i8go, Vol. II,
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most important for the animal. The situation of the primitive man
is not essentially different. The consequences of the activities em-
ployed by him in his explorations and in the attaining of his ends
may be considerably complicated. Take, for instance, his stopping
and listening on hearing the slightest noise; his pursuit and cap-
ture of his prey ; his picking, cracking, and opening of nuts, etc.
The behaviour of civilised man is distinguished from that of the
animal and primitive man merely by the fact that he possesses
more varied and more powerful facilities for investigation and for
the attainment of his ends; that he is able ov^^ing to his richer
memory to make use of more circuitous methods and of a greater
number of intermediary agencies (instruments) ; that his senses
are capable of making more refined and more comprehensive ob-
servations; and, finally, that he is enabled by the richer store of
language at his command to define with greater minuteness and
with greater precision the elements of his activity and sensory per-
ception, to represent these same elements clearly in his memory,
and to bring them within range of the observation of others. The
behaviour of the natural inquirer offers merely a further difference
of degree as compared with the preceding case.
A chemist is able to recognise a piece of sodium at sight, but
does so on the presupposition that a definite number of tests which
he has clearly in mind will unfailingly give the results which he
expects. He can apply the concept "sodium " to the body in ques-
tion with certainty only provided he actually finds the same to be
soft as wax and easily cut, to have a silver sheen on the cut surface,
to tarnish readily, to have the capacity to float and to rapidly de-
compose water, to have the specific gravity 0.972, to burn with a
yellow flame when ignited, to have the atomic weight 23, and so
on. The concept "sodium," accordingly, is merely the aggregate
of a certain series of sensory attributes which make their appearance
upon the performance of certain definite manual, instrumental, and
technical operations, considerably complicated in character. The
concept whale stands for an animal which has outwardly the form
of a fish, but which on careful anatomical examination is found to
have a double circulation, to breathe by means of lungs, and to
possess all the other classificatory marks of the mammals. For the
physicist the concept "electro- magnetic unit" (rw 2^2 j-^^r ~^) stands
for that galvanic current which acting with a magnetic horizontal
component of Zr=o.2 (^gr^ cm-^sec^) on a magnetic needle sus-
pended in the center of a circular wire of radius 31.41 cm. through
which the current has been made to pass, turns that needle 45
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degrees out of the meridian. This presupposes an additional set
of operations for determining H.
The behaviour of the mathematician is similar. A circle is
thought of as a line in a plane, every point of which line can be
shown by measurement or otherwise to be equidistant from a cer-
tain point in the plane. The sum of 7+ 5 is that number, 12, which
is reached by counting onward 5 numbers from 7 in the natural
scale. In these cases also we are required to perform certain well-
defined operations (the measurement of lengths, counting), as the
result of which certain sensory attributes (namely, the equality of
the lengths in the one case, and the number 12 in the other) make
their appearance. The well-defined activities in question, whether
simple or complicated, are analogous in every respect to the opera-
tions by which an animal tests his food; and the sensory attributes
referred to are analogous to the odor or taste which is deter-
minative of the further behaviour of the animal.
Many years ago, I made the observation that two objects ap-
pear alike only in case the sensation-complexes corresponding to
the two objects contain common, congruent, and identical com-
ponents. This observation has been abundantly illustrated else-
where in my works, and I have given of it numerous examples
(symmetric and similar figures, melodies of the same rhythm, etc.^)
Attention was also drawn to the aesthetic value of the repetition of
the same motif."^ The idea was then naturally suggested that there
lay at the basis of every abstraction certain common real psychi-
cal elements, representative of the components of the concept,^ be
those elements ever so recondite. And it was found that the ele-
ments in question were commonly brought to consciousness by
some special and definite activity,—a fact which has been suffi-
ciently discussed in connexion with the examples given above.
The concept is enigmatic for the reason that on the one hand
it appears in a logical aspect as the most definite of psychical con-
structs ; while on the other hand, in a psychological aspect, when
we seek for its real visualisable contents, we discover a very hazy
1 See my Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations, Eng. trans. Chicago, 1S97.
2 See the articles on the Forms ofLiquid and on Syjnnietry originally published at Prague in
1872, and now embodied in the English translation of my Popular Scientific Lectures, third edi
tion. Chicago, 1898. Compare also Soret, Sur la perception du beau, Geneva, 1S92, which carries
the aesthetic considerations much farther than my work, but does not go so deeply into the funda
mental psychological and physiological conditions as does my Analysis ofthe Sensations.
3 Compare Mach, in Fichte's Zeitschriftfiir Philosophie, 1865. Page 5.
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picture only.^ Now the latter, whatever its composition, must
necessarily be an individual picture. The concept, however, is not
di finished image,'^ but a body of directions for testing some actually
existing image with respect to certain properties, or of construct-
ing some image from given properties. The definition of the con-
cept, or the name of the concept, disengages a definite activity, a
definite reaction which has a definite result. The manner of the
reaction,^ as well as of the result, must find its expression in con-
sciousness, and both are characteristic of the concept. A body is
electric when it exhibits certain properties in response to certain
reactions. Copper is a body of which the bluish-green solution
in dilute sulphuric acid exhibits a certain behaviour when sub-
jected to a certain treatment, etc.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the group of operations which is in-
volved in the employment of a concept is frequently complicated in
character, it is not at all remarkable that the result of the same
should be set forth before us as a visual picture only in the simplest
cases. It is furthermore clear that the group of operations in ques-
tion, like the movements of our body, must be thoroughly prac-
tised if we are really to possess the concept. A concept cannot be
passively assimilated; it can be acquired only by doing, only by
concrete experience in the domain to which it belongs. One does
not become a piano player, a mathematician, or a chemist, by look-
ing on ; one becomes such, only after constant practise of the
1 So long as this hazy picture is regarded as the main thing, no understanding of the concept
can ever be readied. Mr. E. C. Hegeler has ingeniously compared the picture in question to Gal-
ton's composite photographs, which are obtained by superposing upon one another the pictures
of the members of a family, whereby the differences are obliterated and the common features of
the family brought into more prominent relief (See Dr. Paul Carus's Fundamental Problems,
Chicago, 1889, page 38). I have compared this phenomenon of the concept to the ^cient
Egyptian paintings which combine in a single picture things which can be seen only by different
views of it (Economical Nature 0/Physical Research, Vienna, 1882, English translation in Popular
Scientific Lectures, Chicago, 1898, page 186). In my Analysis of the Sensations, I have given what
I believe to be a more satisfactory explanation of the question.
2 Compare Analysis ofthe Sensations.
3 Despite all that has been said to the contrary, I find it difficult to comprehend that the inner
vation of a movement does not come directly to consciousness in some manner. The conse
quences only of the motion are said to be brought to consciousness by its sensations in the skin
and the mere memory of these sensations is said to be sufficient to produce the movement again.
It is quite true that we do not know how we perform a movement, but only what the movement is
and that we wish to perform it. When I will io ^o foriuard, this psychical act is to my feeling
in no wise opposed to the memories of the sensations which take place in my legs, but appears to
me far simpler. It was once attempted to identify all sensations of movement with sensations of
the skin, etc., but it is to-day more probable that these sensations proceed in a far simpler and
consequently more reliable manner from definite, specific organs. If my conception is correct,
then that sharp, delicate, and trustworthy feeling for the reactions belonging to certain concepts
is much more easily intelligible. It appears to me as if one could speak in more than a merely
figurative way of the innervation of imagination.
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operations involved. When practice has been acquired, however,
the word which characterises the concept has an entirely different
sound for us from formerly. The impulses to activity which are
latent in it, even when they do not come to expression, or do
not appear in consciousness, still play the part of secret advisers
which induce the right associations and assure the correct use of
the word.^
Just as a technical operation may serve for testing a given ob-
ject (testing by weights, dynamometric tests, the record of an indi-
cator diagram), or for constructing a new object (the building of a
machine), so also a concept may be used in a testing or construc-
tive sense. The concepts in mathematics are mostly of this char-
acter, whereas the concepts of physics which cannot create its ob-
jects, but finds them already present in nature, are ordinarily of the
first-mentioned kind. But even in mathematics, figures arise in-
dependently of the inquirer, furnishing material for subsequent in-
vestigation ; and in physics also concepts are constructed for eco-
nomical reasons. But the fact that mathematics operates in the
main with constructions of its own creation, containing only that
which it itself has put into them, whilst physics must wait before
it finds out how far the objects of nature answer to its concepts,
—this fact is the foundation of the logical superiority of mathe-
matics.
Many of the concepts of mathematics show still another pecu-
liarity. Let us consider the simple concept of the sum oi a-^ ^,
where a and d may first be supposed to be whole numbers. This
concept contains the impulse to count onward d numbers from a
in the natural series, when the last number, a-\-/?, is arrived at. This
act of counting on may be regarded as a muscular activity which is
always the same in all cases, however different, and the beginning
of which is determined by a and the end by d. Through variation
of the values of a and d, an infinite number of cognate concepts is
created. If a and d be conceived as members of a number-con-
tinuum, there results a continuum of related concepts for which
the reaction-^activity is throughout the same, but where the begin-
ning and the end are determined by properties representing mem-
bers of the same continuum. Analogous considerations hold with
respect to the concept of product, etc. The existence of such con-
1 1 have had frequent occasion to observe the power which latent psychical elements possess.
Approaching, while deeply absorbed in thought, the house of a friend, upon whom I intended to
call, I have more than once surprised myself in the act of drawing forth my own latch key. The
word in other cases may call forth the same result as did the sight of the door in the present in-
stance, without arousing to consciousness everything which corresponds to this symbol,
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ceptual continua offers great advantages in those sciences to which
mathematics is applicable.
A reference here to the old controversy of the nominalists and
realists will be in place. There seems to be a germ of truth in both
views. The "Universals" possess no physical reality, but they do
possess a physiological reality. The physiological reactions are of
less complexity than the physical stimuli.
